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The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence
of Tradition
Michael W. McConnell*
Like Brown v. Board of Education' and Lochner v. New York 2
before it, Roe v. Wade3 was the galvanizing constitutional decision of
a generation. Roe stood for the proposition that federal judges can
legitimately decide fundamental questions of social policy on the basis
of their own normative judgment, even in the face of nearly
unanimous contrary determinations under the positive law of the
states.
Much of the constitutional scholarship in the decades after Roe,
and many of the Court's subsequent decisions, can be seen as a
reflection on whether such a power, vested in an unelected judiciary,
is legitimate.4 For the most part, in the years after Roe, the courts
found reason not to repeat the experiment-even in cases, like Bowers
v. Hardwick,6 which presented a more compelling argument for a
"privacy" right than that in Roe. But decisions in this period were
based on their particular facts, and no attempt to articulate an
alternative constitutional methodology ever commanded five votes. On
the one side, Justice Scalia thundered that the courts were usurping
authority that, in our democratic system, belongs to representatives
of the people.6 On the other side, Justices Brennan and Blackmun
charged that Scalia and his allies would make the Constitution a
* Presidential Professor, University of Utah College of Law. This paper was originally
delivered as the Leary Lecture at the University of Utah College of Law on November 25,
1996, prior to argument or decision in the cases under discussion. It was revised for
publication after the decisions were rendered.
The author wrote an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court, without compensation,
on behalf of Senator Orrin Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the United
States Senate, Representative Henry Hyde, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of
the United States House of Representatives, and Representative Charles Canady, the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee. None
of the opinions expressed in this Lecture should be attributed to those gentlemen, nor have
they exercised any influence or control over the writing of this Lecture, which solely reflects
the opinions of the author.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 See Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protectionof Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 199 (arguing that Roe raises "the question whether we have a
written constitution"); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (representing that Roe "is not constitutional law and
gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be").
5 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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"stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and
superstitions of a time long past."' In the middle, Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor would (usually) vote for conservative results without
being willing to commit themselves to any particular constitutional
methodology.'
Last Term, the Roe era came to an end. Washington v.
Glucksberg,9 together with a companion case under the Equal
Protection Clause,"0 squarely presented the question of whether
federal courts, exercising the power of judicial review, have authority
to resolve contentious questions of social policy on the basis of their
own normative judgments. In a soft-spoken opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist that did not even cite Roe, a solid majority of the Court
answered "no." The Court announced a constitutional jurisprudence
of unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause based not on
the normative judgments of courts, but on constitutional text
supplemented by the tradition and experience of the nation. Roe v.
Wade was not reversed on its facts; the abortion right itself remains
secure. But the constitutional methodology under which Roe was
decided has been repudiated. The era of judicial supremacy
epitomized by Roe is over.
I. THE CONTEXT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE Glucksberg DECISION
A. Alternative Approaches to UnenumeratedRights
How should our political community resolve conflicts over
fundamental issues of justice and the common good where
conscientious citizens of good will do not agree? And in particular,
what is the role of the courts? These have been the most persistent
questions of constitutional law in this century. Two answers have
dominated the debate. The first, associated with Justice Hugo Black

7 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring)
("I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of
historical analysis."); Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter) ("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims
may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity
which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.").
9 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), rev'g Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
10 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), rev'g 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). In this
Lecture, I will focus on Glucksberg.
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and, more recently, Judge Robert Bork, is that in the absence of a
constitutional norm derived from the text of the Constitution-such
as the freedom of speech or the equal protection of the laws-courts
have no authority to displace the decisions of the representatives of
the people." The command that neither states nor the federal
government may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law," 2 according to this view, means only that
deprivations of life, liberty, or property must be carried out with "due
process of law"--meaning properly enacted statutes (or common law)
administered according to proper procedures.3 Due process means
"process," and "substantive due process," according to this view, is an
oxymoron. 4 Any attempt to go beyond the rights enumerated by the
Constitution is judicial usurpation.
At the opposite extreme are those judges and scholars who
maintain that the open-ended language of the Constitution is an
invitation to judges to decide, on the basis of their "own views about
political morality," 5 what liberties Americans should enjoy, and to
limit the power of the government to invade those supposed rights in
the absence of what the judges deem to be sufficient reasons. This
approach goes by different names. The term "the living Constitution"
is associated with the late Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 6 Professor
Lawrence Sager calls it the 'justice seeking Constitution." 7 Professor
Ronald Dworkin calls it "the Moral Reading" of the Constitution.

11 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
ROBERT BORE, THE TEArNMG OF AmEiCA THE POLrICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 118-20
(1990).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V (federal government); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (states).
13 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (noting that "the language

appears to focus
of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ...
only on the processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken"); see also Edward S.
Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366,

368-83 (1911).
14 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980).
15 RONALD DWORiN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3-4 (1996).

16 The term "the living Constitution" is widely associated with Justice Brennan, even
though he did not apparently use the term. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels
of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI.L. REV. 1057, 1101 (1990) (referring to
"the living Constitution" as "one of the many contributions that have earned Justice
Brennan his place as one of the most influential Supreme Court justices in our history");
Arlin M. Adams, Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses: The Concept of a "Living
Constitution," 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1319 (1991) (noting that Justice Brennan
consistently defended the "view of the Constitution as a living and evolving document whose
interpretation should not be cabined by too literal a quest for the Framers' intent").
17 Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
ConstitutionalLaw, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 417 (1993).
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Dworkin summarizes the position as follows:
Our legal culture insists that judges-and finally the justices of the
Supreme Court-have the last word about the proper
interpretation of the Constitution. Since the great clauses
command simply that government show equal concern and respect
for the basic liberties-without specifying in further detail what
that means and requires-it falls to judges to declare what equal
concern really does require and what the basic liberties really are.
But that means that judges must answer intractable, controversial,
and profound questions of political morality that philosophers,
statesmen, and citizens have debated for many centuries, with no
prospect of agreement. It means that the rest of us must accept the
deliverances of a majority of the justices .... '8

This makes judging an application of moral philosophy, and for that
reason I will call it the "moral philosophic" approach. 9 This is the
approach toward constitutional law that gave us Roe v. Wade, and it
is the approach that underlay the circuit court opinions that
announced a right to assisted suicide.2 °
The moral philosophic approach dominated constitutional
doctrine during two periods of our history. During the first, at the
beginning of this century, the courts embraced a political morality
based on selective economic libertarianism, striking down such
legislation as minimum wage and maximum hour laws on the ground
that they served no objective public purpose.2 ' With the New Deal,
this period came to an abrupt end and its major precedents were
overruled.22 During the second, which began with the Warren Court,

18 Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be
Overruled, in G. STONE ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 381, 383 (1992).
19 Of course, the moral philosophic approach can take many different forms,
depending on the philosophy favored by the judiciary at any particular time. As Professor
Dworkin has pointed out, it is not the exclusive province of either side of the ideological
spectrum. See id.

20 Some would say that it is also the approach that gave us Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but that ignores the powerful case for Brown on textual and
historical grounds. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalismand the DesegregationDecisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).
21 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). For an excellent analysis of this period, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESEIGED 147-74 (1993).
22 See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236,
244-46 (1941) (overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overrulingAdkins). See generally Robert G. McCloskey,
Economic Due Processand the Supreme Court:An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT.
REV. 34, 36-40.
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the courts embraced a political morality based on selective social
libertarianism, striking down legislation regarding such matters as
abortion, contraceptives, and pornography in the home." This period
lost its steam with the appointment of new, more conservative
Justices by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, but as a doctrinal
2
matter there was never a sharp break. In Bowers v. Hardwick, ' in
1986, the Court appeared to abandon the moral philosophic approach.
But the narrowness of the decision (5-4), the seeming inadequacy of
its reasoning, and the ferocious non-acquiescence by the academy in
the legitimacy of the decision made its viability questionable. (The
Ninth Circuit, in its assisted suicide opinion, suggested that Bowers
is an "aberrant" decision that does not command precedential
authority.') Indeed, the moral philosophic approach seemed to enjoy
a brief revival in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,26 which reaffirmed the
right to abortion on the basis, among other things, of the need to
define "one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life."2" In the end, however, Casey was
28
based more on stare decisis than on this faux philosophic argument.
In other modern cases, the Court, as is its wont, dealt with
questions of unenumerated rights either by divided opinion29 or in
0
ways that left the underlying jurisprudential conflict unresolved.
There was no clear principle upon which lower courts, legislatures, or
litigants could rely.
B. The DoctrinalHolding of Washington v. Glucksberg
In Washington v. Glucksberg,3 ' the Court resolved this doctrinal
uncertainty by setting forth a method of interpreting the Due Process
Clause that falls between these two extremes. The Court began its
doctrinal exposition by rejecting the first position: that the

23 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
566-68 (1969) (pornography).
24 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
25 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 n.65 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), rev d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
26 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
27 Id. at 851.
28 See id. at 845-46.
29 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
30 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115 (1992).
31 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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Constitution provides no protection for unenumerated rights.32 "The
Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical
restraint. The Clause also provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests."3 3 The Court then proceeded to describe what it called "[o]ur
established method of substantive-due-process analysis," 4 which
squarely rejects the moral philosophic approach. This analysis has
three important elements that distinguish it from the alternatives.
First, under the Court's analysis, a person challenging a law on
substantive due process grounds must satisfy a "threshold
requirement" of demonstrating that the "challenged state action
implicates a fundamental right."35 Only then may the court require
"more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to
justify the action."3" This differentiates the Court's approach from one
in which the reviewing court balances the state interest against the
importance of the individual liberty claim in every case. By imposing
this "threshold requirement," the Court "avoids the need for complex
balancing of competing interests in every case."37 It is unnecessary to
examine the governmental justification (beyond mere reasonableness)
unless the claimant has established that the asserted right is
fundamental.
Second, and most significantly, this threshold requirement may
be satisfied only by showing either that the asserted right is textually
based (like the right to freedom of speech), or that it is "objectively,
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." The Court
explained that "[olur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices
... provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking."'' 8
This is an historical rather than a philosophical inquiry. It depends
not on what judges believe the scope of liberty should be, but on what

32 See id. at 2267.
33 Id. (citations omitted).
34 Id. at 2268.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), and Collins, 503
U.S. at 125). The Court went on to add the phrase "and 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'" Id.
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). If this is intended to be an
additional necessary element of the threshold requirement, it is doubtful that many, if any,
claims would survive. In the Court's actual analysis of assisted suicide, the Court made no
further reference to this standard. I infer that the "tradition" standard is sufficient to stand
alone.

No. 3

RIGHT TO DIE

671

the American people have treated as protected liberty through our
history, either through adoption of constitutional text or through
longstanding practice. The opinion for the Court illustrated the
nature of this inquiry by a detailed examination of the common law
and statutory law pertaining to assisted suicide in the United
States. 9 Significantly, the Court extended this historical inquiry all
the way to the present, examining recent history to satisfy itself that
the traditional condemnation of assisted suicide continues to reflect
the mores of the nation.4" Thus, it is not necessary to show that a
challenged practice was protected at the time of adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 but only that it has enjoyed protection over
the course of years. Although the Court did not explicitly say so, the
opinion implied that even a traditional norm could come to violate
substantive due process if it is subsequently abandoned or rejected by
a new stable consensus.42
Third, the Court insisted that this historical inquiry must be
based on "a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest."4 This means that the "liberty interest"44 must be described
with specificity. Airy generalities like "the right to be left alone,"45 or
to make choices "central to personal dignity and autonomy,"46 which

mean almost anything or almost nothing, are too imprecise to support
legal analysis. Because there are so many conceptions of what these
abstractions mean, it would be impossible to determine whether any
such traditions exist, or if they exist, what might be included within
them.47

39 See id. at 2262-66, 2271.
40 See id. at 2265-67.
41 The Joint Opinion in Casey suggests that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
(mis)understood Justice Scalia to be arguing that the content of fundamental rights for
purposes of substantive due process was fixed as of the time "when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified." Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (citing Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6
(Scalia, J., concurring)). Perhaps it is the clarification of this important point that enabled
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy to join the opinion in Glucksberg, when they were not
willing to join Justice Scalia's similar opinion in Michael H.
42 Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 615, 622 (1990) (holding, in
procedural due process context, that tradition must be "continuing" as well as longstanding
to be authoritative).
43 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 302).
44 I personally consider the term "liberty interest" an ugly and unnecessary piece of
jargon. But since the Court uses the term, so must I.
45 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
47 Significantly, this methodological point had been made in slightly different
language by Justice Scalia in a plurality opinion several years before, but did not command
majority support. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121-24 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Acceptance of this point is one of the most important aspects of the Glucksberg decision.
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If the asserted right finds no support in constitutional text or in
deeply rooted history and tradition, then it is not "fundamental," and
the judicial inquiry comes to an end, save for the requirement,
applicable to all laws, that the challenged restriction "be rationally
related to legitimate government interests."48 The effect is to allow the
democratic, decentralized institutions of the country to continue to
ponder the issue, and to adapt to changing mores and national
experience. The Court's approach thus leaves social change and
experimentation to the political branches, and reserves to the courts
the task of enforcing traditional and enduring principles of justice. As
the Chief Justice noted, such a resolution of the constitutional
question 49"permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society."
The traditionalist approach adopted in Glucksberg differs sharply
from the moral philosophic approach not just in its substance but in
its intellectual style. The moral philosophic approach is deductive and
theoretical, deriving specific prescriptions from more general
theoretical propositions. For example, the Ninth Circuit's argument
for recognizing a right to assisted suicide was based on the assertion
that this right is encompassed within a supposed right of each
individual "to make the 'most intimate and personal choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy."'50 The traditionalist approach, by
contrast, is inductive and experiential. Rather than reasoning down
from abstract principles, it reasons up from concrete cases and
circumstances. It can be seen as the conservative heir to legal
realism: cautious, empirical, flexible, skeptical of claims of
overarching theory.
Under the approach outlined in Glucksberg, it should not matter
what the judge's own opinions regarding the "political morality" of the
laws in question may be. In principle, judges of diametrically opposed
opinions on the wisdom or justice of the challenged law should reach
the same legal conclusion, since the decisioi will hinge on objective
historical fact rather than on normative judgment. In some cases, of
course, there will be legitimate differences of opinion regarding the
historical record, which courts will have to resolve. But in many other
cases, the historical analysis will produce a tolerably clear answer. In
Glucksberg itself, for example, there was no serious argument that
the legal traditions of the Nation support the asserted right. Rather,
as the Court stated, "[t]he history of the law's treatment of assisted

48 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
49 Id. at 2275.
50 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813-14.
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suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the
rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it."'" Accordingly, the Court
held that there is no basis for the claim that assisted suicide is a
fundamental
right, and therefore no need for heightened judicial
52
scrutiny.
C. Was There a Clear Holding in Glucksberg?
The judgment in Glucksberg was unanimous, but the majority
opinion commanded only five votes, and there were five separate
concurring opinions. These concurring opinions and the different and
inconsistent statements of the issue that they contain have generated
an unusual degree of confusion about the actual holding in the case.
Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example, who joined an amicus curiae
brief urging the Court to recognize a right to assisted suicide, has
written that, if we examine "what the Court really said," it turns out
that Chief Justice Rehnquist's position represented only a minority
of the Court both as to methodology and as to result.5 3 According to
Dworkin, only three members of the Court agree with Rehnquist's
methodology and five members of the Court "took care not to foreclose
the constitutional debate over [the right to assisted suicide] for the
future."54 A close look at the various opinions is therefore necessary
to assess the authority and precedential significance of the Glucksberg
decision.
In my judgment, the methodological holding of the Court plainly
commanded a solid five votes. Whatever their doubts in earlier cases,
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have joined the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Thomas in a rigorous, tradition-based
methodology for recognition of unenumerated rights under the Due
Process Clause. Three of the Justices-Souter, Stevens, and
Breyer-articulated methodologies at variance with the Court's, but
none of those alternatives attracted the support of any Justice other
than the author. On the merits, eight members of the Court rejected
the claimed right to assisted suicide on the part of competent,
terminally ill patients for the foreseeable future, though one (Souter)
laid out the conditions for possible recognition of such a right after
the states have gained experience with the issue, and three members
of the Court (O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg) reserved the possibility
51 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
52 See id.
53 Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, 44 N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, at 40, 42.
54 Id.
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that a state law prohibiting a terminally ill patient from receiving
adequate pain relief, if such a law existed, might be
unconstitutional.55 Only Justice Stevens, whose "concurrence" should
have been styled a dissent, would accept the basic holding of the
56
Ninth Circuit recognizing a right to die if it were properly presented.
Understanding these opinions requires careful attention to the
way each of the Justices framed the legal issue. Under Washington
law, any person who 'causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide' is guilty of a felony.5" The plaintiffs were three competent,
terminally ill patients who wished to hasten their deaths with the
help of their physicians and four doctors who wished to provide such
assistance. 8 As described by the Ninth Circuit, these plaintiffs
challenged the portion of the Washington statute covering "aid[ing]
another person to commit suicide," both on its face and as applied to
"terminally ill, mentally competent adults who wish to hasten their
own deaths with the help of medication prescribed by their doctors. 59
The district court (Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein) granted the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, holding that the
Washington statute violated their constitutional right "to commit
physician-assisted suicide," 0 but did not differentiate between the
facial and the as applied challenge.
The three patient-plaintiffs died before the case could be decided
on appeal. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, 6 held that the doctor
plaintiffs had standing to continue the suit,62 and thus that the case
was not moot. The Ninth Circuit then affirmed on the merits.
Attempting to cure any uncertainty regarding the district court's
ruling, the court "clariffied] the scope of the relief," stating: "We hold
that the 'or aids' provision of Washington statute RCW 9A.36.060, as
applied to the prescription of life-ending medication for use by
terminally ill, competent adult patients who wish to hasten their

55 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2310 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgments), 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
56 See id. at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments).
57 Id. at 2261 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994)).
58 See id. at 2261 n.4.
59 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790, 794, 797. For an explanation of the distinction
between facial and as applied challenges, see generally Michael C. Dorf, FacialChallenges
to State and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994).
60 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
61 An earlier panel of the Ninth Circuit had reversed the district court, in an exceptionally thoughtful opinion by Judge John Noonan. See Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
62 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 795-96. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125
(1973) (holding that doctor had standing to challenge anti-abortion laws).
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deaths, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.""3 The court expressly declined to address the facial
constitutionality of the Washington law. 4
The Supreme Court contributed to the uncertainty by formulating
the question presented in different terms in various sections of its
opinion.65 At the outset, the majority stated that the question before
the Court was whether 'Washington's physician-assisted suicide
statute is unconstitutional as applied to the 'class of terminally ill,
mentally competent patients.'6 6 Later in the opinion, however, the
Court restated the question as "whether the 'liberty' specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit

suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing

"

so. ,61

With

all respect, this second formulation.of the question presented was not
an accurate depiction either of the holding of the lower court or of the
claim asserted by the plaintiff-respondents. These had been carefully
limited to competent, terminally ill patients. No one in the litigation
asserted that the Washington statute was unconstitutional as applied,
for example, to healthy persons in the prime of life. The inaccuracy
of the Court's restatement of the question proved harmless, however,
because in the next paragraph the Court concluded that there exists
"a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the
asserted right . . . even for terminally ill, mentally competent
adults."' Thus, the Court squarely rejected both the overbroad
statement of the asserted right and the more focused assertion of a
right to assistance in suicide on the part of competent, terminally ill
persons. (Note that neither the Supreme Court majority, nor the
Ninth Circuit, nor the plaintiff-respondents explicitly included any
reference to physical pain in their description of the "as applied"
class, a point which becomes central to the O'Connor, Breyer, and
Ginsburg concurrences.) The Court concluded with the statement:
63 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798 (emphasis added).
64 See id. at 798 n.9.
65 Respondents' question presented was ambiguous as to its facial or as applied character. See Brief for Respondents at i, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No.
96-110) ("Whether the Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of liberty protects the decision
of a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to bring about impending death in a certain,
humane, and dignified manner?").
66 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262 n.6 (quoting id. at 2309 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgments) (explaining holding of Ninth Circuit en banc decision below)).
67 Id. at 2269.
68 Id Under the Court's approach, it is necessary to state the asserted constitutional
right as carefully and specifically as possible. See id. Where, as here, there is no support in
our national experience for the asserted right stated either in general terms (assisted
suicide) or in specific terms (assisted suicide by competent, terminally ill patients), the
difference is inconsequential.
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'Wetherefore hold that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994) does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or 'as
applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their
deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors.' 69 This
holding sets the stage for an analysis of the concurring opinions.
Although the meaning of the concurring opinions is not entirely
free from doubt, it is apparent that only Justice Stevens ultimately
disagrees with the Court about the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting assisted suicide. Indeed, it is a mystery why Justice
Stevens styled his separate opinion as "concurring in the judgments"
rather than as a dissent. Justice Stevens based this description on
what appears to be a patent misstatement of the holding of the
majority: "Today, the Court decides that Washington's statute
prohibiting assisted suicide is not invalid 'on its face,' that is to say,
in all or most cases in which it might be applied. That holding,
however, does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of
the statute might well be invalid."' °
This inexplicably disregards the Court's explicit rejection of the
"as applied" challenge on behalf of competent, terminally ill patients.
What could be the explanation? It is apparently based on mootness.
Justice Stevens explained that because the three patientplaintiffs who had brought the case in district court had died before
the Court of Appeals had rendered its decision, "the court did not
have before it any individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death or
any doctor who was threatened with prosecution for assisting the
suicide of a particular patient."7' According to Justice Stevens, this
meant that the case was entirely a facial challenge to the Washington
statute. He had no difficulty in agreeing with the majority that the
Washington statute is not unconstitutional in every conceivable
application." However, he would not "foreclose the possibility" that
the statute may be unconstitutional as applied to some "terminally ill,

69 Id. at 2275 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838). Chief Justice
Rehnquist dropped a footnote at the end of the opinion stating the obvious: that the decision
does not "absolutely foreclose" the possibility of an as applied claim "in a more
particularlized challenge.' Id. at 2273 n.24 (quoting id. at 2309 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgments)). But the Court noted that "such a claim would have to be quite different
from the ones advanced by respondents here." Id. This indicates that to warrant serious
consideration, any variation on the claim would have to be based on something other than
the competence and terminal illness of the person claiming the right.
70 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments) (footnote
omitted).
71 Id.
72 See id. at 2305. This would include "an ill-advised decision motivated by temporary concerns." Id.
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mentally competent patients."73
Justice Stevens' apparent conclusion that the as applied
challenge was moot does not withstand analysis. As the Ninth Circuit
noted, the proposition that physicians have standing to assert the
legal rights of their patients has been established in many cases, 4
and it is difficult to believe that Justice Stevens intended to question
it. Accordingly, the presence of the physician-plaintiffs in the lawsuit
precluded any holding that it was moot. Moreover, if Justice Stevens
doubted the standing of the physicians to continue the lawsuit, he
should have concluded that the entire case was moot; there was no
more basis for holding that the physicians had standing to raise a
facial than an as applied challenge. If the physician-plaintiffs had
standing to raise the as applied claim, however, Justice Stevens could
not concur in the judgment without contradicting his own position
that at least some competent, terminally ill patients do have a
constitutional right to assisted suicide. His position is therefore
incoherent unless understood as a dissent.
The other separate opinions, by contrast, are genuine
concurrences. Despite the optimistic face that some pro-assisted
suicide commentators have put upon them, they offer virtually no
support for the constitutional protection of a right of physicianassisted suicide.
Apart from Justice Stevens, Justice Souter showed the greatest
sympathy for the constitutional claim. Departing in subtle but
important ways from the majority's constitutional methodology, 5
Souter was not prepared to reject the possibility that the interest
asserted in Glucksberg "might in some circumstances, or at some
time, be seen as 'fundamental.' ' 6 It was not necessary to resolve that
threshold issue, however, because Justice Souter was "satisfied" that
the state's interests in prohibiting assisted suicide "are sufficiently
serious to defeat the present claim that its law is arbitrary or
purposeless."" Justice Souter was persuaded that the legal
prohibition of assisted suicide is necessary to protect patients from
death based on medical mistake (inadequate palliative care, failure
73 Id. at 2309.
74 See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 188 (1973). Petitioners in Glucksberg did not challenge the standing of the physicianplaintiffs, and none of the Justices (other than Stevens) apparently even considered it an
issue.
75 See supra Part I.B.
76 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2290 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
77 Id. One of the oddities of Justice Souter's opinion is that he uses the terms "arbitrary" and "purposeless," which in ordinary constitutional parlance are synonymous with
rational basis scrutiny, as if they referred to some form of heightened scrutiny.
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to treat for clinical depression, or erroneous prognosis of a terminal
condition), and to prevent voluntary active euthanasia.7 8 He noted
that regulations have been proposed to mitigate these concerns, but
concluded that the effectiveness of regulatory safeguards is a matter
for legislative, not judicial, decision. 9 In the face of uncertainty about
the effectiveness of safeguards, legislatures have "more flexible
mechanisms for factfinding," including "the power to experiment,
moving forward and pulling back as facts emerge within their own
jurisdictions."" ° Accordingly, while he would not "decide for all time
that respondents' claim should not be recognized," Justice Souter
"acknowledge[d] the legislative institutional competence as the better
one to deal with that claim at this time."8 ' While Justice Souter did
not specify when, if ever, he might be prepared to override legislative
determinations, he suggested that this would not occur until "we can
say with some assurance which side is right." 2 He explained that
"[a]n unenumerated right should not . . . be recognized, with the
effect of displacing the legislative ordering of things, without the
assurance that its recognition would prove as durable as the
recognition of [constitutional rights . . . derived from some more
definite textual source than 'due process']."s It is unlikely, on an issue
of this sort, that reasonable disagreement will be eliminated, or
consensus reached, in the foreseeable future.8 4
This leaves Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg. Did any of
them disagree with the majority on the constitutional right of
competent, terminally ill persons to commit assisted suicide?
Justice O'Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
majority in its entirety, and therefore must be assumed to concur
both in its holding as to the facial validity of the Washington law and
as to its constitutional application to competent, terminally ill
persons. Nonetheless, she filed a separate concurring opinion,
explaining why she did not consider it necessary to address a

78 See id. at 2290-91.
79 See id. at 2291-93.
80 Id. at 2293.

81 Id.
82 Id. at 2292.
83 Id. at 2293.
84 Professor Dworkin's suggestion that Justice Souter will be willing to override
legislative judgments "when and if better evidence is available or more persuasive studies
have been made," Dworkin, supra note 53, at 42, trivializes Justice Souter's principled
position that legislatures, not courts, must resolve most questions that hinge on reasonable
disagreement about facts. Souter's point was not just that there are not enough "persuasive

studies" on which a court could base a conclusion, but that legislatures have greater
competence and legitimacy in such matters.
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"narrower question" not addressed by the majority, namely: "whether
a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has
a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances
of his or her imminent death.""5 The difference between this
formulation and the question addressed by the majority is that it
focuses on patients who are "experiencing great suffering." More
precisely, Justice O'Connor was concerned with the question "Whether
suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in
obtaining relief from the suffering that they may experience in the
last days of their lives." 8 She explained that there was no need to
address the question, however, because under the challenged state
laws, "a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is
experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication,
from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point
of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.""7 It is thus
apparent that Justice O'Connor was not disagreeing with the majority
over its rejection of the putative right of competent, terminally ill
patients to commit assisted suicide, but was signaling her belief that
it might be unconstitutional for a state to erect "legal barriers" that
would restrict the ability of such a patient to obtain adequate pain
relief.
This interpretation is confirmed by Justice Breyer's concurrence,
which praised and joined Justice O'Connor's separate opinion.88 After
suggesting that a better way to formulate the asserted constitutional
right would be to "use words roughly like a 'right to die with dignity,"'
Justice Breyer stated that it was not necessary to decide whether
such a right would be "fundamental" because an "essential part" of
any such claim would be "the avoidance of severe physical pain," and
"as Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force a
dying person to undergo that kind of pain." 9 Justice Breyer
explained:
Were the legal circumstances different-for example, were state
law to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the
administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of
life-then the law's impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable

85
86
87
88

Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).

89 Id. at 2311.
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physical pain (accompanying death) would be more directly at
issue.9 0
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice O'Connor's opinion without
further comment, except insofar as it joined the majority opinion."
Thus, three Justices (O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg) might find
constitutional problems with a statute that foreclosed the patient's
ability to obtain relief from pain, but so long as the law does not
interfere with the administration of pain relief, these Justices were
in agreement with the majority in rejecting a right to assisted suicide.
On the merits of assisted suicide, then, there was no substantial
disagreement (and perhaps no disagreement at all) between any of
the Justices other than Justice Stevens. On the question of
methodology, however, Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter
expressed disagreement with the majority. 2 Justice Ginsburg
presumably should be counted as among those with methodological
disagreements, since she refused to join the majority opinion-though
her refusal to join any of the concurrences that set forth a divergent
view makes her precise position difficult to discern. I therefore score
the decision as 8-1 on the merits, and 5-4 on the constitutional
methodology. It is significant, moreover, that Justices Souter and
Breyer both took pains to emphasize that they were not advocating
a return to anything like the pure moral philosophic approach to
substantive due process. Both took their bearings from the second
Justice Harlan, the most conservative member of the Warren Court.
Both advocated an approach to substantive due process in which
courts have the latitude to recognize fundamental interests that are
"related, but not identical" (in Justice Breyer's words) to previously
recognized constitutional rights.9 3 This is a more expansive approach
than the majority's, but is more cautious and restrained than the
moral philosophic alternative. Among the nine members of the Court,
Roe-style judicial imperialism found only one stalwart defender,

90 Id. at 2312.
91 See id. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments).
92 Professor Dworkin's claim that Justice O'Connor's opinion "makes it plain that she
still does not accept Rehnquist's historicist understanding of the due process clause,"
Dworkin, supra note 53, at 40, is without foundation. Not a word of Justice O'Connor's
opinion was addressed to methodological issues. She joined the Rehnquist opinion, which
certainly suggests that she agrees with it. Dworkin's notion that Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy joined the majority opinion "out of institutional courtesy," id., rather than because
they agreed with it, is evidently a product of wishful thinking.
93 Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments). He uses the phrase "related,
but not identical" twice. See id. Cf id. at 2281-85 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgments)
(describing his approach).

No. 3]

RIGHT TO DIE

681

94
Justice John Paul Stevens.

II. A THEORETICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND TEXTUAL-HISTORICAL
JUSTIFICATION OF THE Glucksberg APPROACH
TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
I believe the Court's traditionalist approach to adjudication of
unenumerated rights claims announced in Glucksberg is wise,
workable, and firmly grounded in principles of American
constitutionalism. It provides a check against particular states or
local jurisdictions whose practices contradict what most Americans
would deem to be fundamental rights, but does so without licensing
courts to second-guess democratic judgments on the basis of their own
ideological or philosophical preferences. It must be admitted, however,
that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court does not supply
much in the way of reasons to support its position. Most strikingly,
the opinion makes no reference to the historical purposes or
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides the
supposed textual basis for judicial action of this sort. The opinion is
almost ostentatiously non-theoretical. To be sure, the Court wisely
observed that when it extends constitutional protection to an asserted
right, it "place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action" and that promiscuous use of the power will "subtly
transform[ I" the Due Process Clause "into the policy preferences of
the members of this Court."9 5 But the opinion did not explain why the
former consequence is contrary to our structure of government or why
the latter is inconsistent with the theory of a written constitution.
Nor did it explain why its own approach-reliance on history and
tradition-solves the problem. Perhaps the Court thought these
things are obvious.
For those who find the Court's reasoning less than obvious, let
me provide an explanation. In the sections that follow, I will explain
first, the theoretical foundation of the Court's approach; second, why
the Court's approach follows from a proper understanding of the
judicial role in our constitutional system; and third, the connection
between the Court's approach and a proper theory of interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment and its history.

94 See id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments).
95 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997), rev'g Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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A. Democracy and Conventionalism
It is a postulate of our political system that legitimate
government has its origins in the consent of the governed. To be
legitimate, therefore, constitutional rulings must trace their
authority, in some sense, to decisions of the people. Even if there
were reason to suppose that decisions of the nine Supreme Court
Justices would likely be wiser and more just than decisions of the
people (which there is not), this would not be a sufficient ground for
allowing the Justices to base decisions on their own moral and
political opinions, since such a government would no longer be a
government of the people.
That is why Chief Justice Rehnquist's insistence that
constitutional rulings be based either on constitutional text or on
longstanding national consensus makes sense. These are two
alternative ways of discerning the will of the people. Constitutional
text was formally adopted by a supermajority of the people, and
deserves respect for that reason. Longstanding consensus similarly
reflects a supermajority of the people, expressed through
decentralized institutions. No single vote, no single electoral victory,
no single jurisdiction suffices to establish a tradition: it requires the
acquiescence of many different decision makers over a considerable
period of time, subject to popular approval or disapproval. When
judges base their decisions either on constitutional text or on
longstanding consensus, they do not usurp the right of the people to
self-government, but hold the representatives of the people
accountable to the deepest and most fundamental commitments of the

people.
Moreover, reliance on longstanding consensus is likely to be a
more reliable means of reaching a correct result. The problem with
decisions based on moral philosophy-like all versions of natural law
adjudication-is the uncertain application of theoretical principles to
concrete issues. There are limits to the capacity of human reason to
reach a definitive answer to many questions of political morality.
Unless expressed at a high level of generality, principles of natural
law appear arbitrary and contestable rather than natural; but so
expressed, the principles are virtually useless for deciding actual
matters of controversy.
We might be able to agree on highly generalized principles like
"human dignity," "fair play," or "equal concern and respect," but how
those abstractions will apply to such specific questions as affirmative
action, capital punishment, or proper modes of service of process (to
name a few examples) is a matter of disagreement among reasonable
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people. The attraction of natural law is its seemingly universal
reasonableness; but specific applications to specific issues lose that
quality of universality. When a court announces that the abstract
principle of "equal concern and respect" mandates (or precludes)
affirmative action, or the principle of personal autonomy mandates (or
precludes) assisted suicide, the judge is not in any realistic sense
"applying" natural law, but is merely applying his own opinion about
affirmative action or assisted suicide. There is no reason the judge's
opinion should prevail over that of the people.
In the absence of any reliable basis for resolving moral and
philosophical disagreements of this sort (other than whether a
position accords with our own opinion!), courts should look to
experience and to stable consensus as an objective basis for decision
making. If a practice is adopted by many different communities, and
maintained for a considerable period of time, this provides strong
evidence that the practice contributes to the common good and
accords with the spirit and mores of the people. To be sure, there can
be bad, evil, or counterproductive traditions; but if so, one would
expect to see a movement away from them. At least, there is more
reason to have faith in the product of decentralized decisions, based
on experiments and experience over a period of many years, than in
the abstract theorizing of particular individuals, even oneself.
Imposition of a new, untried, principle will almost certainly have
unintended and unpredictable consequences, which is why prudent
statesmen are guided by experience rather than by idealistic
speculation.96
This (and not the superior reasoning power of judges) was the
original basis on which the common law commanded authority. As
explained by the great common lawyer Sir John Davies:
[A] Custome taketh beginning and groweth to perfection in this
manner: When a reasonable act once done is found to be good
and beneficiall to the people, and agreeable to their nature and
dispositon, then do they use it and practise it again and again,
and so by often iteration and multiplication of the act it
becometh a Custome; and being continued without interruption

time out of mind, it obtaineth the force of a Law.
And this Customary Law is the most perfect and most
excellent, and without comparison the best, to make and

96 This point is associated with the political philosophy of Edmund Burke. See, e.g.,
EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH ON THE PETITION OF THE UNITARIAN SOCIETY, reprintedin EDMUND
BURKE: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 313 (Peter J. Stanlis ed., 1963); EDMUND BURKE,
SPEECH ON THE REPRESENTATION OF COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT, reprinted in id. at 328-36.
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preserve a Commonwealth. For the written Laws which are
made either by the Edicts of Princes, or by Councils of Estates,
are imposed upon the Subject before any Triall or Probation
made, whether the same be fit and agreeable to the nature and
disposition of the people, or whether they will breed any
inconvenience or no. But a Custome doth never become a Law
to bind the people, untill it hath been tried and approved time
out of mind, during all which time there did thereby arise no
inconvenience: for if it had been found inconvenient at any
time, it had been used no longer, but had been interrupted,
and
97
consequently it had lost the virtue and force of a Law.
The voice of tradition is thus the voice of humility: the assumption
that when many people, over a period of many years, have come to a
particular conclusion, this is more reliable than the attempt of any
one person (even oneself) or small group of persons (such as the
Court) to chart a new course on the basis of abstract first principles.
The moral philosophic approach, by contrast, necessarily
presupposes that judges are wiser, fairer, more reflective decision
makers than those who are more immediately accountable to the
public. Alas, there is no evidence to support that presupposition.
Indeed, a decentralized process in which many different people, of
differing perspectives and walks of life, can participate-directly or
indirectly-in the decision making process, is more likely to produce
a balanced and sensible conclusion. Federal judges are, almost
without exception, well meaning and well educated people. But the
courts are a narrow institution, no less prone to prejudice (of a
particular sort) than anyone else. Judge Stephen Reinhardt's opinion
for the Ninth Circuit dismissed views on assisted suicide contrary to
his own as "cruel," "untenable," "disingenuous and fallacious,"
"meretricious," "ludicrous," and "nihilist."" The court praised its own
view as "more enlightened."99 The court characterized hundreds of
years of common law precedent as "taboos," linked to superstition;' 00
it brushed aside the central text of medical ethics, the Hippocratic
Oath, saying that it "does not represent the best or final word on
medical or legal controversies today."' 01 The Ninth Circuit criticized

97 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 33 (1987)
(quoting Sir John Davies, dedication of his IRISH REPORTS (1612) to Lord Chancellor
Ellesmere).
98 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 821-25 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 820.
101 Id.
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the conclusions of the American Medical Association and the
American Geriatrics Society (among others) as reflecting "a
misunderstanding of the proper function of a physician."0 2 The
sublime arrogance of these judicial pronouncements highlights the
danger of allowing courts to set social policy, in defiance of
legislatures and referenda, on the basis of their own (often illinformed) philosophical intuitions.
By relying on the experience and settled judgment of the nation,
rather than their own opinions, judges thus keep faith with the
democratic postulates of our system, and at the same time are more
likely to reach answers that will stand the test of time.
B. The InstitutionalDimension
The question of assisted suicide provides an excellent context for
consideration of the institutional dimensions of judicial review of
novel claims of constitutional right, precisely because of the
unambiguous character of the historical record. The case for a right
to assisted suicide rested entirely on philosophical, not historical,
premises and the case thus highlighted the pitfalls of constitutional
decision making based on such premises. Under the moral philosophic
approach, courts are instructed to determine for themselves what is
the best answer to the problem posed. Indeed, in Glucksberg, the
Court had the benefit of an unusual amicus curiae brief, signed by six
of America's leading political philosophers, which argued that the
Court should recognize the right of terminally
ill patients to the
03
assistance of doctors in shortening their lives.
But there is every reason for courts to be wary about overturning
duly enacted legislation on the basis of untried and uncertain moral
and philosophical arguments, where the result is bereft of support in
directly relevant constitutional text or in national experience. It may
well be true that attitudes about the end of life have changed, or will
change, in response to technological developments and their attendant
economic and emotional consequences. But no one knows what the
actual consequences of various possible policies would be. It would be
a grave mistake for the federal courts to leap in and attempt,
prematurely, to resolve the issue or to accelerate the pace of change.
Even on the heuristic assumption that laws against assisted suicide
and euthanasia should be relaxed in some fashion, it is better that

102 Id. at 828.
103 See Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers'Brief 44 N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41, 41-47.
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reform take place in decentralized and accountable institutions.
A jurisprudence grounded in text and tradition is not hostile to
social change, but it assigns the responsibility to determine the pace
and direction of change to representative bodies. As Justice Scalia has
argued, the argument over traditionalist jurisprudence
has nothing to do with whether "further progress is to be made" in
the "evolution of our legal system." It has to do with whether
changes are to be adopted as progressive by the American people
or decreed as progressive by the Justices of this Court. Nothing we
say today prevents individual States from limiting or entirely
abandoning the [traditional position]. And nothing prevents an
overwhelming majority of them from doing so, with the
consequence that the "traditional
notions of fairness" that this
4
Court applies may change.'
The great institutional strength of courts is their ability to provide
uniform enforcement of legal principles, with consistency across
parties, regions, and time periods, treating like cases alike. Where
operative principles are in flux and the consequences of new
approaches are unpredictable, however, that virtue becomes a vice.
Constitutional judicial review is too inflexible a process to deal
sensitively and appropriately with the question of assisted suicide.
First, by locating the right to die in the federal constitution,
judicial recognition of such a right would nationalize the issue and
eliminate the possibility of state variation and experimentation.
Justice Brandeis's characterization of the states as "laboratories of
democracy"1 5 is no clich6; it is an apt description of one of the
principal virtues of a federal system. 0 6 There was no serious
argument in Glucksberg that national uniformity is necessary or even
desirable. The state of Oregon has undertaken an experiment in
physician-assisted suicide °7 that-however misguided it may appear
to many of us-will cast light on the practical consequences: on the
efficacy of the safeguards against abuse, on the ability of the medical
profession to recognize and treat clinical depression and pain in
patients requesting suicide, on the robustness of the lines drawn
between permitted and forbidden forms of the right to die, and on the
danger that death will come to be perceived as a duty owed to family
104 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627 (1990) (Scalia, J., opinion joined

by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.) (citations omitted).
105 New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106 See generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-1500 (1987).
107 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 to 127.897 (Supp. 1996).
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and society. To treat this social policy question as controlled by
federal constitutional law is to eliminate the possibility of a
multiplicity of approaches, and of regional variation in light of
differences in social and moral perceptions.
Even a leading advocate of physician-assisted suicide, and
sometime co-author with one of the doctors who was a party
challenging the laws, has recognized that the right to die should be
the subject of legislative reform rather than judicial fiat:
Legalization of physician assisted suicide should be understood not
as a matter of recognizing rights but as a policy aimed at making
available a compassionate option of last resort for competent,
terminally ill patients. Since we do not know whether such a policy
will produce more good than harm, it should be viewed as an
experiment.
Our federal system of government has often been touted as
offering "a laboratory of the states," with which to experiment
concerning social policy. In the case of a morally controversial
issue, subject to competing arguments pro and con, it is better that
policy experimentation occur piecemeal, by the various decisions of
the legislatures or voters of the states, rather than wholesale,108by
means of the constitutional adjudication of the federal courts.
Second, by their nature constitutional judicial decisions may not
be "compromises with social and political pressures."0 9 The lines
drawn by courts, under the authority of the Constitution, must be
defensible at the level of constitutional principle. Yet not every aspect
of social life can be governed by crisp and principled rules.
Sometimes, the best and most peaceful solution to contentious moral
conflicts in society is not to award the brass ring to one side or the
other, but to construct compromises that allow each contending force
to believe that the system has been responsive to their deeply held
convictions. Legislatures are good at that.
Whatever one may think of legislators as moral deliberators, few
would dispute that they have the expertise and incentive to resolve
social conflict in a way that minimizes political opposition and
resistance. The legislative answer may not appear pure from a
philosophical or analytical perspective, but it is likely to reduce social
discord. And even if legislatures prove unable to forge a stable
consensus, contending social forces are more likely to accept the

108 Franklin G. Miller, Legalizing Physician-AssistedSuicide by JudicialDecision:
A CriticalAppraisal, 2 BIOLAw S:136, S:144 (Special Section 1996).
109 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
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outcome of a process in which their voices were heard than an
imposed solution in which their elected representatives were not
entitled to a significant role. This is one of the lessons of the abortion
decisions.
The right to die is such an issue. The public is seriously divided.
Passions run high. The various lines that might be drawn-refusal of
treatment versus suicide, assisted suicide versus active euthanasia,
terminal illness versus chronic pain or disability, actual consent
versus imputed consent, intolerable pain versus other conditions that
harm the quality of life, one set of safeguards versus another, and so
forth-are, each of them, arbitrary in their own way. Each of them
attempts to allow the dying patient some greater degree of control
over the circumstances of his death, while at the same time upholding
society's obligation to honor life and protect the vulnerable. Each tries
to reconcile two honorable impulses that are, in principle,
irreconcilable: autonomy and protection. Legislatures, better than
courts, can make the compromises necessary to accommodate these
conflicting ideals.
Third, and most importantly, courts are seriously constrained in
their ability to change their policy in response to experience and
criticism. Each decision of the Court is said to be based on an
interpretation of the Constitution, and it strains public credulity that
the meaning of such an old document would change very rapidly, very
often. The doctrine of stare decisis thus creates a heavy presumption
in favor of existing doctrine." 0 Stability is a source of judicial strength
and legitimacy. But with this strength comes a caution: just as the
Court is properly reluctant to jettison a constitutional doctrine that
it has embraced, the Court should be reluctant to embrace novel
constitutional doctrines that may require modification in the future.
As Justice Souter commented, "[a]n unenumerated right should not
therefore be recognized, with the effect of displacing the legislative
ordering of things, without the assurance that its recognition would
prove as durable as the recognition of [textually based constitutional
rights] .""
Finally, the asymmetrical nature of the risks of judicial error
suggests that, in close cases, the courts should defer to legislative
judgments. In any case in which a party claims that the decision of
our politically responsive institutions is unconstitutional, there are
two possible risks. One risk is that the Court will uphold a law that
is unconstitutional, thus allowing the continued infringement of

110 See id. 854-70.
111 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgments).
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constitutional rights. Examples would be Plessy v. Ferguson,"' which
upheld Jim Crow legislation segregating private railways, or
Minersville School Districtv. Gobitis,"' which upheld a requirement
that Jehovah's Witness schoolchildren be compelled to participate in
the flag salute. The opposite risk is that the Court will strike down
a law that is constitutional, thus frustrating representative
government and, in many cases, infringing statutory rights and
protections. Examples would be Dred Scott v. Sandford,"' in which
the Court held it was unconstitutional for Congress to bar slavery
from the territories, and Lochner v. New York," 5 in which the Court
invalidated maximum hour legislation.
While both types of error have serious consequences, the former
can be corrected by political means; the latter cannot. When the Court
upholds unjust governmental action, citizens can turn to political
means for relief, and legislative branches are able to correct the
injustice. The majority of states outlawed transportation segregation
notwithstanding Plessy, and school boards were free to exempt
schoolchildren from the flag salute even if this was not required by
Gobitis. This provides the seeds for change. When the Court
erroneously strikes down legislation, however, it disables the political
branches from correcting the error. The only remedies are
constitutional amendment, political action to force the Court to
reverse its judgment, or (as in the case of Dred Scott) violence or civil
war. For these reasons, the repeated admonitions by some of the
greatest Justices in the Supreme Court's history in favor of a
presumption of constitutionality carry great weight." 6 A wise court,
recognizing its own fallibility, will stay its hand in close cases where
powerful arguments exist on both sides.

112 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
113 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
114 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
115 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
116 See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
625 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("On more than one occasion, this Court has expressed the
cautious circumspection with which it approaches the consideration of [constitutional]
questions; and has declared, that, in no doubtful case, would it pronounce a legislative act
to be contrary to the constitution."); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827)
(Washington, J.) ("It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity and the
patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its
validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.");
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 354-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stressing "the
long established presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute"); United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[W]hile unconstitutional exercise
of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial
restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.").

690

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[1997: 665

Glucksberg is a perfect example. If the Court had affirmed the
lower courts' creation of a right to assisted suicide, neither Congress
nor the states would have been able to explore contrary policies. Any
substantial burden on the exercise of the new "right" would
presumably be held invalid. If that judgment proved to be misguided,
great injury would have been done to thousands of vulnerable persons
in every state in the Union, until the Court brought itself to
acknowledge the mistake and reverse the decision. On the other hand,
under the Court's actual judgment upholding assisted suicide laws,
debate on the issue can proceed in the future. The fifty states will
remain free to pass laws allowing assisted suicide or euthanasia in
such circumstances and under such safeguards as they may deem
advisable. If experiments with liberalized laws on this subject are
successful, it is likely that still more states will follow suit. If they
prove misguided, these states can reverse course, and the other states
will profit by their example.
A jurisprudence based on tradition is responsive to these
institutional issues. It leaves room for experimentation and variation
among the states, until such time as a stable national consensus has
emerged and persisted. Then it may be advisable to force remaining
outlier states to conform to the national norm. It allows
representative institutions and common law courts to work out
broadly acceptable compromises instead of imposing a prematurely
"principled" (and therefore rigid) answer to the question. And it
allows for adaptation and change. Only when a particular answer has
stood the test of time should it be constitutionalized through
substantive due process.
One final observation about the institutional capacities of courts
and legislatures bears mention. Since the United States v. Carolene
7 decision, prominent strains of constitutional theory have
Products".
maintained that the judiciary should be most willing to intervene in
cases where the adverse consequences of the challenged law are borne
by discrete and insular minorities whose interests may not have
received their just weight in legislative deliberations."' Whatever the
merits of that view in the abstract, 1 9 it is inapplicable to the assisted
suicide question. When the New York legislature decided to retain its
laws against assisted suicide, or the people of Washington made a
similar decision by referendum, they were not legislating for a

117 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
118 See generally ELY, supra note 14, at 96.
119 For a skeptical view, see Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
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discrete and insular minority. They were legislating for themselves
and for their loved ones, behind a veil of ignorance that denies all of
us the knowledge of what our condition may be in the final days of
our lives. There is no reason to distrust the conclusions that they
reached. As Justice O'Connor observed:
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a
family member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the
democratic process will not strike the proper balance between the
interests of terminally ill, mentally competent individuals, who
would seek to end their suffering and the State's interests in
protecting20those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under
pressure.
If anything,, the biases of the political process run the other
way-favoring fewer protections against euthanasia than may be in
the best interests of those immediately affected by the law. Studies
indicate that the frail elderly, who are most likely to feel the effects
of the law in this area, are significantly less likely to favor legalizing
assisted suicide than the young and healthy. 12 ' This is not surprising.
From the vantage point of youth and health, the quality of life
enjoyed by disabled, chronically ill, or dying people appears
excruciatingly low. But persons experiencing those conditions, whose
point of comparison is not youth and health but death, often cling to
life with increased tenacity. Self-interest, both individual on the part
of family members and collective on the part of health care providers,
also plays its part in shaping opinion on this issue. Suicide is cheap
and convenient. The logic of CaroleneProducts, in this context, is that
courts should be more active in ensuring that the protections against
unwanted death are adequate than in ensuring that the political
process is sufficiently receptive to the right to die.

C. The Glucksberg Approach as an Interpretation
of the Text and History of the FourteenthAmendment
Constitutional judicial review had its birth in the recognition that
a written constitution reflects the limits that the people of the United

120 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303.
121 Harold G. Ktenig, et al., Attitudes of Elderly Patients and Their Families Toward
Physician-AssistedSuicide, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2240, 2240 (1996) (reporting
that only 34% of elderly outpatients favor legalizing physician-assisted suicide, as compared
to 55.6% of their families, and noting that female, black, and economically disadvantaged
patients were most likely to oppose it).
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States have placed upon their government. 1 22 It was no part of the
theory of judicial review that the courts are superior to the people in
their judgments of what those limits should be. It is revealing that
the examples employed by Chief Justice Marshall in his great
exposition of the theory of judicial review consisted of explicit
limitations unambiguously violated by the government. 123 In such
cases, it was clear that judicial review served to enforce the will of the
people rather than the will of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, in the 210 years since the Constitution was adopted,
the Supreme Court has frequently struck down acts of the political
branches that do not violate any express provision. The most common
basis for so doing is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This presents a jurisprudential problem: the very
language of the Due Process Clause, which forbids the denial of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, necessarily implies
that states may deny life, liberty, and property if due process of law
is provided-unless some other provision of the Constitution is
implicated. The notion of "substantive due process," as many
distinguished commentators have pointed out, is an oxymoron-like
"green pastel redness," in the famous comment of John Hart Ely."24
From the perspective of text and history, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would appear to be
a more plausible basis for the protection of substantive rights
(whether incorporated from the Bill of Rights or based on other
sources) than the Due Process Clause. This Clause provides that "[n]o
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States."" As discussed below,
the language "privileges or immunities" was a legal term of art that
also appears in the Comity Clause of Article IV, 26 and that had been
interpreted as referring to the essential rights and freedoms
recognized in the American constitutional tradition. If there is any
textually and historically plausible authorization for the protection of
unenumerated rights, it is to be found in this Clause-not the Due
Process Clause. 27

122 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
123 See id. at 178.
124 ELY, supra note 14, at 18. For a thorough analysis of various readings of the Due
Process Clause that might support a substantive interpretation, see John Harrison,
Substantive Due Process and the ConstitutionalText, 83 VA. L. REV. 493 (1997).
125 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
126 See id. amend. IV.
127 This conflicts with the rationale (though not necessarily the result) of the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-80 (1873), which reduced the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to the redundancy of protecting only those rights already protected
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Why does this matter? Any constitutional jurisprudence of
substantive rights, if conducted under the rubric of the Due Process
Clause, must necessarily appear to be based on something other than
constitutional text and the authentic purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, such a jurisprudence will appear to have been
created by judges with no delegation of constitutional authority by the
people. Not only does this give the very idea of judicial protection of
rights not specified by the text an undeserved aura of illegitimacy, it
also-and more importantly-deprives us of a textual or historical
basis for distinguishing between responsible and irresponsible
exercises of that judicial power. Once it is recognized that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause authorizes protection for rights
understood in a particular way, there is a solid basis for
distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate uses of that power.
Although the Due Process Clause is essentially about process and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is essentially about substantive
rights, the underlying principles and methodologies for application
are analogous and complementary. The task of interpretation is
greatly eased by the fact that each Clause had its counterpart in the
Bill of Rights"R and in Article IV," respectively, and each had been
authoritatively interpreted at the time those provisions were used in
the new Fourteenth Amendment. When the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment used familiar legal terminology, it may be inferred that
the terms were intended to be interpreted in light of then-prevailing
doctrine. When John Bingham, principal author of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was asked what was meant by "due process of law," he
responded: "I reply to the gentleman, the courts have settled that long
ago, and the gentleman can go and read their decisions." 30

under the Constitution and arising as a matter of federal citizenship. The overwhelming
weight of historical and scholarly opinion is that Slaughter-Housewas wrong in this regard.
See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1257-59 (1992); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 175-79 (1986); John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privilegesor Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1466-69 (1992); Walter E. Murphy,
Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and the Limits on ConstitutionalChange, 1987 AM. J. JURIS.
1, 1-8 (1987); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT- FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 156-65 (1988). A rare exception to this scholarly
consensus is ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW 36-39 (1990).
For an explanation of the reasons why Slaughter-Housewas inconsistent with the text
and original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Michael W. McConnell,
Originalismand the DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 998-1000 (1995).
128 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

129 See id. art. IV, § 2.
130 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
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The leading case interpreting the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV in the years prior to the Civil War was Corfield
v. Coryell,'3 ' written by Justice Bushrod Washington on circuit. The
court defined the privileges and immunities of citizens as consisting
of
those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from
32
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.
In other words, these "fundamental" rights 3 had two characteristics:
(1) they were recognized by "all free governments," and (2) they had
been enjoyed by citizens "of the several states" from the beginning of
the Republic. These are historical, not moral or philosophical,
judgments. Corfield was repeatedly cited by proponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment
to explain what rights the new Amendment
134
would protect.

The leading case interpreting the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause prior to the Civil War was Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Co.' 5 In that case, Justice Benjamin Curtis (later
to be the leading dissenter in Dred Scott) offered the following
methodology for determining what "due process" entails in any
particular case:
We must examine the constitution itself, to see whether this
process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be
so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding
existing in the common and statute law of England, before the
emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been
unsuited to their civil and political constitution by having
been
36
acted on by them after the settlement of this country.1

131 6 F. Cas. 546 (1823).
132 Id. at 551.
133 It should be noted that the term "fundamental" rights did not necessarily mean
rights that are especially important. Rather, in England, America, and western Europe,
"fundamentality" most often referred to the character of being long-standing or ancient. See
POCOCK, supra note 97, at 30-36, 47-55; J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 160 (1955).

134 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1835-36 (1866) (Rep. Lawrence);
id. at 474-75 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 2765 (1866) (Sen. Howard).
135 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
136 Id. at 277.
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In other words, the content of due process is determined (1) by
constitutional language and (2) by "settled usages and modes of
proceeding": in other words, by text and tradition (precisely the
position espoused by the Glucksberg majority). In the first important
due process case after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Hurtado v. California,"7 the Court reiterated this interpretation.
These two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment thus have two
common features. First, they take their bearings from the longestablished rights and procedures of the American states. They are,
accordingly, preservative rather than transformative. They are
guarantees against unwarranted and unwise innovation; they are not
invitations to judicially-mandated social change. This does not mean
that the rights protected by these clauses are frozen in time. They
may change as society changes. But before a claim may be accepted
as a Fourteenth Amendment right, and imposed on the people of all
the states, it must have attained widespread support, and been
confirmed by experience. The Fourteenth Amendment is not a license
for judicial social experimentation.
Second, the two clauses have the effect (as intended by the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment) of nationalizing the question
of rights. Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were the
principal locus of rights protection. Accordingly, the privileges and
immunities of Americans were described in Article IV as 'Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 3 ' In the
Fourteenth Amendment, these rights became known as "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States."13 They had become
national in character. Moreover, under the new Amendment the
power of the United States was deployed to prevent any state from
abridging these rights, even as to its own citizens. As Bingham
explained, the Amendment "protect[s] by national law the privileges
and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall
be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State." 40
The traditionalist interpretation, embraced by the Court in
Glucksberg, is consistent with this understanding because it allows
diversity among state law rights when there exists no stable national

137 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884).
138 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
139 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
140 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). For further elaboration of this
point see Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American
Revolution or the Logical Culminationof the Tradition?,25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1164-68
(1992).
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consensus, and requires uniformity with respect to rights after a
national consensus has emerged and persisted.
In practice, as interpreted by Corfield, Murray's Lessee, Hurtado,
and now Glucksberg, this means that an individual may challenge the
denial of any right that has been recognized by a sufficiently large
number of states for a sufficiently long period of time so that it can
truly be said to be part of the fabric of American liberty.1 4 ' In the
years after Corfield, Murray's Lessee, and Hurtado, the Supreme
Court sometimes exceeded the authority implied by those cases, and
invalidated legislation without valid warrant in either express
constitutional provisions or the settled judgment of the Nation. The
most obvious examples are the decisions known as "the Lochner
era."'4 In other decisions, which have gained in respect and influence
over the years, the Court defined the reaches of unenumerated rights
in terms not dissimilar to those in Corfield, Murray's Lessee, and
Hurtado.
In his prescient dissent in Lochner v. New York,' Justice
Holmes argued that instead of deciding the case on the basis of their
own economic theories, the Justices should rely on "fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law."' This approach was embraced by the Court in
Snyder v. Massachusetts.4 5 In that case, Justice Cardozo explained
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." 46

141 Analogies might be drawn to the process of divining customary international law
from the established practices of many states, or of determining the general common law
in the period before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
142 Justice Souter has suggested that the failing of the Lochner line of cases was that
they were "absolutist." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2279, 2281. That is a misunderstanding.
Even in the heyday of Lochnerian activism, the Court uliheld far more instances of economic
regulation than it struck down, and the lines drawn were often subtle. See HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED 7-62; Herbert Hovenkamp, The PoliticalEconomy
of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988); Charles Warren, The
Progressivenessof the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1913). The
problem was not that the Court imposed inflexible or absolutist criteria, but that it
exercised judgment and discretion of a sort that is properly reserved to legislatures.
143 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
144 Id.
145 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
146 Id.; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing "those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality by
Powell, J.) ("[Tihe Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-24 (1989) (plurality) (asserting that protected liberties
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Perhaps the leading statement of this approach in the modern
47
period was Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,
later to form the basis for his opinion in Griswold:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can
be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have
felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it broke.
which it developed as well as the
148 traditions from
That tradition is a living thing.
This statement is sometimes read as if it authorized judges to draw
a balance based on their own perceptions of the proper reach of the
law, rather than on the balance struck "by the country." But the very
point of Justice Harlan's concurrence was to condemn the idea that
judges should engage in "unguided speculation" about what freedoms
are most important to human life. As the remainder of the Poe
concurrence shows, Justice Harlan's constitutional analysis was
rooted in the actual decisions of state lawmakers in the fifty states.
That is why he declared "conclusive" the "utter novelty of this
enactment [outlawing the use of contraceptives] .,14 No other state,
Harlan found, "has made the use of contraceptives a crime."5 °
Although Harlan made other comments elaborating reasons why the
right to use contraceptives has enjoyed this degree of protection, it
was this objective history-not his own moral reasoning, and not any
analogies drawn from unrelated cases-that Harlan found
"conclusive." The Poe concurrence is thus strikingly similar to the
Glucksberg majority opinion.
If Harlan's interpretive method departed from that in Corfield,
Murray'sLessee, and Hurtado,it was in his emphasis on tradition as
a "living" thing. It is not necessary, Harlan seemed to be saying, that

must be "interest[s] traditionally protected by our society").
147 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (referring to discussion in Poe,
367 U.S. at 542).
149 Poe, 367 U.S. at 554-55.
150 Id.
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the tradition have existed unbroken from the time of the Founding,
as implied in Corfield, Murray's Lessee, and Hurtado. It is
sufficient-as Harlan's analysis in Poe and Griswold bears out-that
a substantial consensus of the states had recognized the right for a
period long enough that it came to represent the will of the Nation.' 5 '
This is consistent with the position implicit in the Glucksberg
opinion'5 2 that only those traditions that survive have authority. It
implies that the rights recognized for purposes of substantive due
process may change, slowly, over time.
The traditionalist jurisprudence of Glucksberg is therefore
defensible not just as a means of cabining judicial discretion and
preserving the role of democratic institutions, but as an interpretation
of the very language of the Fourteenth Amendment. In using the
familiar legal terms "privileges or immunities of citizens" and "due
process of law," the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
invoking a well-established jurisprudence in which the rights of the
people were based on a combination of constitutional text (mainly the
Bill of Rights) and longstanding custom and usage.
D. The Misappropriationof Justice Harlan
One of the curious side issues in Glucksberg was a struggle for
the mantle of second Justice Harlan. As discussed above, Justice
Harlan sought to describe a judicial role in the definition and
enforcement of unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause
that was grounded in judgments of "the nation" rather than the moral
philosophical opinions of the judiciary. In this, his opinion anticipated
the constitutional methodology articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in Glucksberg.
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Souter attempted to
invoke Justice Harlan's Poe concurrence in support of a more
expansive judicial role in determining the substance of due process
liberties. 5 ' But it is difficult to see why Harlan's deeply conservative
opinion would give Souter any comfort. Harlan's central insight was
that constitutional judicial review under the Due Process Clause must

151 The necessity of viewing tradition as a "living" thing was reaffirmed in Burnham
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627 (1990) (Scalia, J., opinion joined by Rehnquist, Co.J.,
and Kennedy, J.). In Burnham, Justice Scalia explained that when "an overwhelming
majority" of states adopts a new policy at variance with the older tradition, this will force
the Court to change its understanding of what due process protects. Id.
152 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2265 ("Though deeply rooted, the States' assistedsuicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed.").
153 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2282-83.
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not be based on the judges' own "unguidedspeculation.""4 The judges
must, instead, seek the "balance" that "ourNation"has struck. This
does not mean that judges are entitled to don the robe of the
philosopher king and second-guess the decisions of legislatures. As in
Marbury, there is no suggestion that the judges are superior to the
people in their capacity to determine the proper restraints on
government. The judges instead must enforce the will of the people
as it is reflected in the traditions which they have developed, as well
as the traditions from which they broke.
Justice Souter disagreed with the methodology prescribed by the
majority in Glucksberg in three important respects. First, rather than
insisting that an asserted right be determined to be "fundamental"
before the court is empowered to balance the right against
governmental interests, Souter engaged in "careful scrutiny of the
State's contrary claim" on the basis of a lesser showing.'55 Second, in
examining the relevant tradition, Souter did not confine the analysis
to a carefully defined right asserted in the case. Instead, he based his
analysis on supposed similarities to other rights recognized in the
past. He found it significant that the states had repealed their
criminal prohibitions on suicide (even though they maintained and
even strengthened their laws against assisted suicide), 5 ' that the
courts had recognized other constitutional rights related to "bodily
integrity" (namely, abortion rights), 5 7 and that the courts had
recognized other constitutional rights that involve "medical counsel
and assistance" (abortion again). 58 Under the majority's analysis,
these analogies were not persuasive. The rights invoked by Justice
Souter, even if analogous in some respects, are easily distinguishable
on the basis of practical differences, and the specific asserted right to
assisted suicide had been uniformly rejected throughout American
history. Third, Justice Souter did not rely on the traditional
judgments of "this Nation" as much as on analogies to prior
judgments of the Supreme Court. 159
On each of these points Harlan's opinion supports the majority
rather than the concurrence. Harlan, like the majority, "insist[ed] on
a threshold requirement that the interest.., be fundamental before
anything more than rational basis justification is required," as Souter

154
155
156
157
158
159

Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added).
See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2290.
See id. at 2286-87.
Id. at 2288.
Id. at 2288-89, 2290.
Id. at 2288 (stressing analogies to abortion decisions).
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acknowledged in a footnote. 160 Harlan, like the majority, insisted on
"exactitude" in defining the asserted right.'6 ' Rather than describing
the asserted right in Poe as one to sexual intimacy, privacy, or any
other broad category of rights, Harlan analyzed the precise question
of the right of married couples to use contraceptives within the
privacy of the marital bedroom.'6 2 And finally, Harlan-like the
Glucksberg majority-insisted that substantive due process takes its
bearings from the judgments of "our Nation," rather than the political
morality of the Supreme Court Justices. 6 ' Thus, for all Justice
Souter's emphasis on the Poe concurrence, that opinion provides him
no support for any of the points on which he disagreed with the
majority.
E. Abortion as a CautionaryNote
The abortion decisions have been the most significant cases in
modern times in which the Supreme Court departed from the
traditional approach to the Due Process Clause. In Roe v. Wade,"' the
Court struck down a state law prohibiting abortion notwithstanding
the fact that such laws had been in place in almost all the states for
at least 100 years.'6 5 It is easy to see why the Ninth Circuit cited the
abortion cases as precedent.'66 The Ninth Circuit found "highly
instructive" and "almost prescriptive" a passage from the Casey joint
opinion that referred to "the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime," and which stated: 'At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."" 6 In
reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court took pains to limit
the expansive implications of this passage, stating (implausibly) that
Casey did not authorize the creation of new fundamental rights not
rooted in history and tradition.'" In effect, the majority limited Casey
to its facts.
Although there is no reason to think that Roe's specific holding
on the right of abortion will be overruled any time soon, Glucksberg

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 2283 n.9.
Id. at 2285.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 536, 539.
Id. at 530.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 119, 138-39.
See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 799-802.
Id. at 813-14 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
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makes plain that the decision no longer carries weight on the broader
question of how to determine the content of unenumerated rights.
Despite its prominence in constitutional theory, the Supreme Court
has cited Roe in support of a new substantive due process right only
once since the case was decided twenty-three years ago, and that case
was amply supported by traditional due process methodology. 6 9 Even
before the explicit reformulation of constitutional doctrine in
Glucksberg, the Court was extraordinarily reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process.7 That is a sign of the weakness
of Roe's conceptual foundations.
With the perspective of twenty-five years, it is now possible to
view the abortion cases with a more dispassionate eye. While abortion
rights now have a substantial popular constituency and the Court is
unlikely to abandon them, it is apparent to many (even to supporters
of the "right to choose") that the Court's sweeping decision, at one
stroke, to invalidate the laws of almost every state on a matter that
is deeply controversial among the people of this nation, was of
questionable legitimacy and even more questionable prudence. Now,
a quarter century after the Roe decision, the abortion question
continues to be the most divisive in American politics, poisoning
everything from presidential nominating conventions to the
confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justices. Many supporters
of abortion rights believe that those rights would have been achieved
with less contention and greater public acceptance if the matter had
been left to the political process,' 7 ' as it was in other Western
nations. 72 Touching a hot stove can be a kind of precedent.

169 See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500. Roe has been cited in
several cases involving the right to contraceptives, but in light of Griswold these cannot be
said to be new substantive due process rights. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services, 431
U.S. 678, 684-90, 694, 699 (1977). Roe was also cited in several equal protection cases,
though not in recent years.
170 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
171 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Partof the Constitution,
6 LAW & INEQ. J. 17 (1988); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy & Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
172 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW

10-39 (1987).
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III. ASSISTED-SUICIDE LAWS ARE NEEDED TO
PROTECT VULNERABLE PEOPLE FROM
COERCION AND MEDICAL MISTAKE
In summary, the constitutional methodology announced by the
Court in Glucksberg has a solid basis both in the institutional
dynamics of judicial review and in the history and theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In light of that sound foundation, the clear
majority the case commanded on the Court, and the lack of any
competing methodology commanding substantial support on the
Court, it is likely that Glucksberg will be a lasting and powerful
precedent. That is cause for celebration. Glucksberg represents a
healthy swing of the pendulum away from unguided judicial power
and toward the power of decentralized, representative institutions.
There is another reason for celebration as well: on the merits, the
Court's rejection of the asserted right to assisted suicide was wise and
humane, and may have averted a national moral disaster. While it is
possible that some individual states will legalize assisted suicide in
some narrow contexts, and likely that medical practice will continue
to evolve in this area, the Court made a significant contribution to
stopping what had appeared to be an ideological juggernaut, which
would have disserved the interests of the very people it purported to
protect. Not only has the Court provided time for reflection on the
difficult questions touching on the end of life, but the decision, and
the publicity surrounding it, has called attention to serious and sober
arguments against the recognition of any right to assisted suicide.
Thoughtful and experienced doctors, ethicists, philosophers,
lawyers, theologians, and advocates for patients have offered cogent
reasons why assisted suicide should not receive the formal sanction
of law. The professional associations in the disciplines closest to the
problem-the American Medical Association, the American
Psychological Association, the American Geriatrics Society, and the
American Bar Association among them-have all concluded that
assisted suicide should not be made legal. The two most
comprehensive and respected studies undertaken of the issue-one
under the auspices of the State of New York and one under the
auspices of the British House of Lords-both resulted in unanimous
recommendations that laws against assisted suicide (as well as
euthanasia) should be retained.'7 3 Although there are many

173 See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 120 (1994)
[hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT]; HOUSE OF LORDS, SESS. 1993-94 REPORT OF THE SELECT
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arguments in favor of laws prohibiting assisted suicide, I will
summarize four of the most important.
First, even assuming for sake of argument that in a limited
number of cases assisted suicide might be ethically permissible, many
knowledgeable observers believe that the problems of abuse would be
so widespread and uncontrollable that formal legal and ethical
prohibition is necessary. 74 The harsh reality is that a more
expeditious death for terminally ill patients would often serve the
interests of others, especially in this era of managed care and
exploding medical costs. A patient weakened by illness and pain is
peculiarly susceptible to influence from family members or doctors
who are in a position of trust.'7 5 It would not be difficult for these
individuals, for their own reasons, to exert subtle-but
powerful-pressure on a frail patient to "choose" the convenient
option of a speedy death. Even the suggestion by a well-meaning
doctor that a patient should consider the option of death will
inevitably convey the message that-in the doctor's informed
76
professional opinion-the patient's life is no longer worth living.
For every suffering person who makes a rational, informed choice
to die, there will be others-perhaps many times as many--on whom
that "choice" is effectively imposed. And there will be no way to tell
the difference.
To be sure, safeguards have been proposed. Indeed, the Ninth
77
Circuit professed faith that "sufficient protections" can be enacted.1
Unfortunately, these were expressions of hope rather than
descriptions of experience. Many physicians and ethicists doubt that
effective safeguards can be devised or enforced-especially since
typically no one involved in the death will have the incentive to
expose wrongdoing, and the interactions involved are cloaked in the
confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship. The American
Medical Association's code of Medical Ethics, for example, rules out
physician-assisted suicide partly on the ground that it "would be

COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHIcs 58 (1994).
174 See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at xii, 102, 119-20, 140.
175 See id. at 89.

176 See Assisted Suicide in the United States: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 113 (1996) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Dr. Herbert Hendin); Leon R. Kass & Nelson Lund, PhysicianAssisted Suicide, Medical Ethics and the Future of the Medical Profession, 35 DUQ. L. REV.
395, 409 (1996).
177 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 833.
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difficult or impossible to control."'78
The specter of widespread abuse and exploitation is not based on
mere speculation. Studies of assisted suicide and euthanasia in the
Netherlands, where safeguards are stringent on paper, show that
those safeguards are routinely disregarded.'7 9 Although medical
guidelines recognize the right to die only if based on the patient's own
informed and voluntary decision, a survey of 300 physicians disclosed
that over forty percent had performed euthanasia without explicit
consent.8 0 In 1990, in addition to 2,300 cases of active euthanasia
with consent and 400 cases of assisted suicide, there were over 1,000
cases of active nonvoluntary euthanasia performed without the
patient's knowledge or consent, including roughly 140 (fourteen
percent) where the patient was fully competent.' Comparable rates
of nonvoluntary euthanasia in the United States would be roughly
20,000 per year.'82 And these numbers do not even include cases
where "consent" was extracted by means of undue influence,
psychological coercion, or skewed information.
Giving choices to the vulnerable is not always liberating. A young
woman is not more "free" if the law allows her to contract with a
pimp; a young man is not more "free" if a pusher can sell him crack
cocaine; a child is not more "free" if he can "consent" to sexual
advances by adults; people are not more "free" if they can voluntarily
sell themselves into slavery. Nor is an ill person necessarily more
"free" if he can agree to kill himself. Indeed, the mere availability of
assisted suicide as a socially-legitimated alternative may impel some
who would prefer to live to accept this course out of feelings of guilt

178 AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS, CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 2.211 (1994). For an extensive
discussion of these issues, see Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of
Physician-AssistedSuicide: Creatinga Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1
(1996). See also NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 73; Hearing, supra note 176, at
316-17 (statement of Dr. Lonnie Bristow on behalf of the American Medical Association:
"1Ilt is difficult to imagine adequate safeguards which could effectively guarantee that
patients' decisions to request assisted suicide were unambivalent, informed and free of
coercion . . . ."); id. at 115 (statement of Dr. Herbert Hendin).
179 CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS 127-33 (1991).
180 See John Keown, Some Reflections on Euthanasiain the Netherlands,in EUTHANASIA, CLINICAL PRACTICE AND THE LAW 193, 209 (Luke Gormally ed., 1994).
181 See John Keown, FurtherReflections on Euthanasiain the Netherlands in the
light of the Remmelink Report and the Var Der Mass Survey, in EUTHANASIA, CLINICAL
PRACTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 180, at 230.
182 See id. at 221-23; Callahan & White, supra note 178, at 15-18; GOMEZ, supra
note 179, at 1-18; Hearing,supra note 176, at 106-13, 114-15 (statement of Dr. Herbert
Hendin).
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or shame about the burdens (financial and otherwise) that the choice
of continued living would impose on their families. This is not a
matter of some people "imposing their morality" on others. It is a
matter of all citizens reflecting on the conditions that they may face
at the end of life, and establishing rules that will protect all of us
when we are weakest and most vulnerable.
Second, if death is defined as a "mercy," it will be difficult to
justify refusing this mercy to broader and broader categories of
sufferers. It is therefore misleading to confine one's attention (as the
lower courts did) to "competent, terminally ill adults who wish to
hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their
doctors."" For example, the moral arguments supporting assisted
suicide for terminally ill patients who are able to self-administer the
killing agent apply just as strongly to similar patients who cannot do
the deed for themselves. Thus, if the logic supporting assisted suicide
is valid, there is no sound reason to resist voluntary active
euthanasia." 4 And the moral arguments supporting assisted suicide
for the terminally ill apply with as much force-maybe more-to
persons who face not a few weeks or months, but years of pain that
seems to them intolerable. Thus, assisted suicide for the terminally
ill will almost surely merge into assisted suicide for those with
incurable chronic conditions. 185 Persons with serious disabilities will
be particularly at risk.8 6 And (as cases like Cruzan187 so eloquently
demonstrate), the argument for assisted suicide for competent adults
will apply with seemingly equal force to those unable to consent for
themselves, whose "right to die" will be exercised by surrogates. If
death is seen as a mercy, why confine it to those fortunate enough to
be able to consent? The same corrosive skepticism that the advocates
of assisted suicide evince toward the distinction between refusal of

183 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838. It is a striking example of the illogic of the
decisions below that they declare the longstanding distinction between assisted suicide and

refusal of life-sustaining treatment to be a distinction without a difference, only to propose
new distinctions that have far less logical, empirical, or ethical justification. See Yale
Kamisar, The "Rightto Die": On Drawing(And Erasing)Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 481, 483-85
(1996).
184 See Kamisar, supra note 183, at 513-19; Dan W. Brock, VoluntaryActive Euthanasia,HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10, 11. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit intimated
that it did not regard the distinction between assisted suicide and active voluntary
euthanasia as significant. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 831-32.
185 See Kamisar, supra note 183, at 502-13.
186 See Hearing,supra note 176, at 53-70 (statements of Diane Coleman and Carol
Gill).
187 Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that
Constitution does not forbid state from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent's wishes regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment).
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treatment and active assisted suicide would be equally potent to
dissolve all of the other limitations on this newfound right.
It is even difficult to understand why the "mercy" of assisted
suicide should be denied to persons who, for reasons other than ill
health, conclude that the suffering of life is unbearable. Physical pain
and impending death are not the only-and not necessarily the most
serious-reasons to desire a release from these mortal coils. Patients
are free to refuse life-sustaining treatment for any reason whatsoever.
Once we conclude that death is a matter of personal autonomy-of
privacy-where can we stop? 88
Third, if patients' requests for assistance in suicide are honored,
many will die unnecessarily, as a result of medical mistake. According
to medical experts, the desire to commit suicide (even among the
terminally ill) is typically associated with clinical depression, which
is a treatable disease.'8 9 The New York State Task Force reported:
"Studies that examine the psychological background of individuals
who kill themselves show that 95 percent have a diagnosable mental
disorder at time of death. Depression, accompanied by symptons of
hopelessness and helplessness, is the most prevalent condition among
individuals who commit suicide." 90 When treated for depression,
patients typically cease to desire suicide.' 9'
Much of the desire to commit suicide is also traceable to
insufficiently aggressive measures to alleviate pain. 92 When a
suicidal patient is helped to deal with pain and depression, his or her
natural desire to live typically is restored. To give patients the "right"
to obtain assistance in suicide is to license the killing of persons who
often are simply in need of help, which modern medicine can give.
Professor Herbert Hendin, a professor of psychiatry at New York
Medical College, testified:
Patients who request euthanasia are usually asking in the
strongest way they know for mental and physical relief from

188 The implications of this decision extend beyond assisted suicide and euthanasia.
For example, what will be the effect on laws allowing the use of physical force to prevent
suicide?
189 See Hearing,supra note 176 (statement of Dr. Herbert Henin).
190 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 11; see also id. at 13 ('In one study of
terminally ill patients, of those who expressed a wish to die, all met diagnostic criteria for
major depression."); J.H. Brown et al., Is It Normal for Terminally Ill Patientsto Desire
Death?, 143 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 208 (1986).

191 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 26 (reporting that treatment of depression
.resulted in the cessation of suicidal ideation for 90 percent of these patients").
192 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 16-17; Hearing,supra note 176, at 309-10
(statement of Dr. Lonnie Bristow on behalf of the American Medical Association).
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suffering. When that request is made to a caring, sensitive, and
knowledgeable physician who can address their fear, relieve their
suffering, and assure them that he or she will remain with them
to the end, most patients no longer
want to die and are grateful for
193
the time remaining to them.
Since American doctors are notoriously uninformed about proper
pain prevention techniques,'94 as well as depression,' 95 it is almost
certain that many people will be induced to die when instead they
could receive effective palliative treatment. 196 The ethical problem is
magnified by the fact that economically disadvantaged patients and
members of racial and ethnic minorities are the most likely to lack
proper treatment for pain and depression, and thus the most likely to
"choose"-unnecessarily-to die.'9 7 Other groups especially at risk are
women and the elderly.' 9
Fourth, and most fundamentally, by making death a legally
available "choice," we would inevitably change the way our culture
perceives the final stages of life. When death is not an official option,
the focus of the patient, the patient's family, the doctor, and the
system is on what can be done to make the patient's life easier and
better. If death becomes an approved social option, both the patient
and the system will tend, instead, to focus on whether continued care
is "worth it." The patient, aware of the burden she is imposing on
loved ones, may well conclude that she "owes it" to her family to
commit suicide. The decision to cling to life will come to be regarded
as wasteful, irrational, and selfish. In the uniquely vulnerable
circumstances of the suffering patient, the "right to die" will become,
for many, the moral duty to die.' 99 One blessing of the current law is
that it relieves the elderly and the infirm of the need to justify their
continued existence.

193 Hearing,supra note 176, at 115-16.
194 See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 33 (reporting that "pain is often overlooked by health care providers"); id. at 43 (stating that "the delivery of pain relief is grossly
inadequate in clinical practice"); Hearing, supra note 176, at 18-20 (statement of Dr.
Kathleen Foley, Chief of Pain Service at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center).
195 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 32; id. at 32-33 (reporting study finding
that fewer than fifteen percent of depressed residents of nursing home for elderly had been
correctly diagnosed, and fewer than twenty-five percent had been treated for depression).
196 See id. at 40 (noting that 'modern pain relief techniques can alleviate pain in all
but extremely rare cases"); Hearing, supra note 176, at 310, 314-15 (statement of Dr.
Lonnie Bristow on behalf of the American Medical Association).
197 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 44, 46; Hearing,supra note 176, at 412
(statement of Dr. Carlos Gomez).
198 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 44; see also id. at 33.
199 See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 173, at 95.
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Even if the laws against assisted suicide are rarely enforced, they
still have the effect of expressing society's deep commitment to the
protection of human life. In combination with the ethical precepts of
the medical profession, these laws ensure that assisted suicide
remains a highly exceptional activity, rarely suggested or initiated by
physicians. If assisted suicide is recognized as a "right," it will become
both routinized and common. It is not obvious that the change would
be for the better.
IV. CONCLUSION
Last Term, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the decisions of two federal courts of appeals holding that
competent, terminally ill adults have a constitutional right to procure
the assistance of their physicians in ending their lives.200 This was
probably the most important constitutional case involving a claim of
unenumerated individual rights in the past twenty years. Not only
did the Court resolve a substantive issue of great sensitivity and
importance (leaving the answer to the people of the various states),
but it announced a decisive shift in constitutional doctrine regarding
unenumerated rights. The assisted suicide decision marked the end
of an era characterized by cases, like Roe, in which the Justices took'
upon themselves the right to decide contentious issues of moral and
social policy, independent of text, history, or democratic judgment.
The Court articulated an approach under which the decisions of
democratically accountable institutions regarding questions of
morality and social policy will not be second-guessed by the courts
unless there is a firm basis for doing so either in the constitutional
text or in "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices."2 ' In
so doing, the Court not only took a major step toward restoring the
proper balance between courts and legislatures under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also helped to preserve a wise and humane policy of
protecting vulnerable patients at the end of their lives.
It is easy to criticize decisions of the Supreme Court. It is also
important to recognize those occasions when the Court has rendered
the nation a service. Washington v. Glucksberg was such a case.

200 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), rev'g Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997),
rev'g 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
201 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268.

